27th January 2025 – Strangford Ferry – Max 34% actual usage

To highlight the reality of the ferry service across Strangford Lough, below is the evidence of estimated usage of Strangford Ferry against theoretical maximum capacity, showing utilization rates and key constraints:

ANNUAL COMPARISON (Theory Max vs Actual Usage) over last 25 years

THEORETICAL MAXIMUM CAPACITY:
Two vessels operating optimally:

  • Regular service: 3,136 vehicles/day max (both vessels)
  • Refit periods: 1,344 vehicles/day (MV Strangford only)
    Annual theoretical maximum: ~700,000 vehicles

Year | Est. Annual Usage | % of Max Capacity | Key Factors

1999: 164,250 | 23.5%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Constraints: Older vessels
  • Note: Pre-modernization period

2000: 171,550 | 24.5%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Constraint: Old vessel limitations
  • Context: Growing demand vs limited capacity

2001: 177,025 | 25.3%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Event: Preparation for new vessel
  • Note: Operating at vessel capacity limits

2002: 189,800 | 27.1%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Event: MV Portaferry II introduced
  • Impact: Immediate capacity increase

2003: 200,750 | 28.7%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Note: Growing confidence in new service
  • Source: Service reliability improvement

2004: 209,875 | 30.0%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Context: Service establishing reliability
  • Constraint: Peak time limitations

2005: 215,350 | 30.8%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Source: Strategic Review references
  • Note: Growing peak time pressures

2006: 219,000 | 31.3%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Context: Economic growth period
  • Constraint: Morning peak capacity

2007: 224,475 | 32.1%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Peak pre-recession usage
  • Note: First signs of capacity strain

2008: 211,700 | 30.2%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Impact: Financial crisis
  • Reduced pressure on capacity

2009: 200,750 | 28.7%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Context: Economic downturn
  • Usage decline masks capacity issues

2010: 195,275 | 27.9%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Recession impact continues
  • Service reliability issues emerging

2011: 197,100 | 28.2%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Source: Strategic Review data
  • Maintenance issues noted

2012: 198,925 | 28.4%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Slow recovery begins
  • Service reliability affecting usage

2013: 202,575 | 28.9%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Strategic Review conducted
  • Capacity issues documented

2014: 208,050 | 29.7%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Economic improvement
  • Peak time pressures return

2015: 213,525 | 30.5%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Growing maintenance issues
  • MV Strangford aging noted

2016: 219,000 | 31.3%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Source: Financial data available
  • Service constraints increasing

2017: 222,650 | 31.8%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Rising operational costs
  • Reliability affecting capacity

2018: 224,475 | 32.1%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Cost recovery issues
  • Service limitations evident

2019: 228,125 | 32.6%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Pre-pandemic peak
  • Maximum reliable capacity reached

2020: 164,250 | 23.5%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • COVID-19 impact
  • Artificial demand reduction

2021: 182,500 | 26.1%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Recovery begins
  • Service restrictions continue

2022: 219,000 | 31.3%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Return to pre-pandemic levels
  • Capacity issues re-emerge

2023: 231,775 | 33.1%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Growing demand
  • Service reliability issues

2024: 237,250 | 33.9%

  • Theory Max: 700,000
  • Current usage
  • Source: DfI figures

KEY OBSERVATIONS:

  1. Capacity Utilization:
  • Never exceeded 34% of theoretical maximum
  • Highest utilization in 2024 at 33.9%
  • Average utilization ~30% over 25 years
  1. Limiting Factors:
  • Service reliability
  • Weather disruptions
  • Staff availability
  • Maintenance requirements
  • Peak time constraints
  1. Hidden Demand:
    From “Strangford Lough Crossing Comments Summary”:
  • Peak time turn-aways not recorded
  • Discouraged travel not captured
  • Alternative route choices not measured
  • Business expansion limitations

This analysis suggests significant suppressed demand, with actual usage constrained by:

  1. Service reliability
  2. Capacity limitations during peak times
  3. Operating hour restrictions
  4. Weather dependencies
  5. Maintenance requirements

In simple terms, two clapped out ferry boats and civil service management principles.

The large gap between theoretical maximum and actual usage appears more related to service constraints than lack of demand, supported by survey data showing 94% dissatisfaction with current service capacity.

and DfI Minister John O’Dowd and officials says;

Core Position:
“I agree that a permanent crossing would improve journey times compared to the current ferry service but regrettably it is considered that there would currently be insufficient economic benefits to justify such a major investment”

And if further evidence was required, the “Cleddau bridge v Ferry traffic” comparison data and local demographic information, one can project a likely Year 1 scenario for SLC:

PROJECTED YEAR 1 BRIDGE USAGE:

Current Ferry Usage (2024):

  • 650 vehicles per day
  • 237,250 vehicles annually
  • 33.9% of theoretical ferry capacity

Projected Bridge Year 1:
Based on Cleddau Bridge experience:

  • Initial year showed 885,900 crossings (1975)
  • Represents 3.7x increase over current ferry usage
  • Would equate to ~2,400 vehicles daily

Key Drivers for Increased Usage:

  1. Suppressed Demand Release
    From “Strangford Lough Crossing Comments Summary”:
  • 24/7 availability vs limited ferry hours
  • No weather-related cancellations
  • No capacity constraints
  • No waiting times
  1. New Journey Patterns
    Census 2021 data shows:
  • Ards & North Down: 163,659 population
  • Newry, Mourne & Down: 182,074 population
  • Currently limited cross-lough commuting
  • Potential for significant workforce mobility
  1. Emergency Services
    From RCN report (16/1/2025):
  • Immediate emergency vehicle access
  • No service interruptions
  • Direct hospital routes
  • Improved healthcare delivery
  1. Business Growth
    “Business-intelligence-sub-regional-intelligence-council-area-profile” indicates:
  • New business opportunities
  • Enhanced distribution networks
  • Expanded customer bases
  • Increased tourism potential
  1. Educational Access
    Current limitations removed:
  • School choice expansion
  • After-school activities accessible
  • Further education opportunities
  • Sports and cultural activities

Financial Implications:

  • Bridge toll revenue potential: 885,900 × average toll, say, £3, which equates to £2.66m income in Year 1 and unlimited growth potential thereafter, to 4,745,000 by comparison, over 50 years
  • Elimination of £3.52m annual ferry operating costs
  • Reduced journey costs for users
  • Economic growth benefits

This analysis suggests Year 1 bridge usage would likely exceed three years of current ferry usage combined, fundamentally transforming regional connectivity and economic potential.

Minister O’Dowd’s evidence ?

Next time DfI officials try hard to think of excuses, consider the following; below is an analysis of Executive department budgets being impacted by the current crossing situation:

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
From “RCN – On the Frontline of the UK’s Corridor Care Crisis”:

  • Additional ambulance resources required for 75km detours
  • Extended emergency response staffing
  • Duplicate healthcare services
  • Increased patient transport costs
  • Additional staff travel costs

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Based on Census data and education patterns:

  • Duplicate school transport services
  • Increased transport subsidies
  • Additional school bus routes
  • Higher staff travel costs
  • Extended journey times impacting budgets

DEPARTMENT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE
From “DFI 2024-0366 – Barry – Response”:

  • £3.52m annual ferry operating costs
  • Only £1.43m income (41% cost recovery)
  • Net annual subsidy £2.09m
  • Additional road maintenance on longer routes
  • Ongoing vessel replacement costs

DEPARTMENT FOR ECONOMY
Business intelligence profile shows:

  • Lost economic growth potential
  • Reduced business rates income
  • Tourism development constraints
  • Employment mobility costs
  • Skills access limitations

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND RURAL AFFAIRS
From “Fisheries NI – Summary action points”:

  • Additional transport costs for agricultural products
  • Marine diesel subsidies for ferry
  • Environmental costs of extended journeys
  • Rural development constraints

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES
Census data implications:

  • Social service delivery inefficiencies
  • Community cohesion impacts
  • Sports and leisure access costs
  • Cultural service duplication

The evidence suggests significant cross-departmental budget inefficiencies that could be reduced through a fixed crossing, potentially offering substantial public sector savings across multiple departments.