DfI and positive spin. Imagine if privately operated Strangford ferry service

Explaining how DfI appears to put a positive spin on the ferry service through several key techniques:

  1. Selective Statistics Usage:
    From TOF-1389-2024:
  • Emphasizes “96.69% reliability” while downplaying that this means 848 cancelled sailings
  • States “only 108 were cancelled due to fog” and “only 32 were cancelled due to staff unavailability” – using minimizing language
  • Presents 550 cancelled sailings due to industrial action as separate from “service reliability”
  1. Framing Of Issues:
    From COR-1578-2024 (Minister’s response):
  • Describes service as “reliable” and “currently the most economical method”
  • Frames limited hours as “operates every day except Christmas day” rather than acknowledging no overnight service
  • Positions ferry as “complementing existing road network” rather than addressing isolation issues
  1. Deflection From Core Problems:
    From DOF 2024-0440 documents:
  • Focuses on individual service disruptions rather than systemic issues
  • Avoids addressing fundamental capacity constraints
  • Minimizes impact of:
  • No 24-hour service
  • Limited capacity during peak times
  • Age of vessels
  • Economic impact on communities
  1. Contrast with Community Evidence:
    From Strangford Lough Crossing Comments Summary:
    Community identifies major issues:
  • “Too much uncertainty and no reliable ferry service”
  • “Having to leave the house half an hour early to beat queues”
  • “Currently operates at a financial deficit, is basic for the times we live in”
  • “For far too long, the people of Strangford and Portaferry have been highlighting the inadequacies”
  1. Cost and Investment:
    From financial data in recent DfI correspondence:
    2023/24 figures show:
  • Operating costs: £3.52m
  • Income: £1.43m
  • Yet frames 41% cost recovery as positive achievement

The positive spin appears designed to:

  1. Justify continued ferry-only service
  2. Avoid pressure for major infrastructure investment
  3. Maintain status quo despite clear community dissatisfaction
  4. Present service as adequate despite evidence to contrary

This approach contrasts sharply with the comprehensive evidence in public consultations and community feedback showing widespread dissatisfaction and calls for significant service improvements or alternative crossing options.

Sources:

  • TOF-1389-2024 response
  • COR-1578-2024 Minister’s letter
  • DOF 2024-0440 documents
  • Strangford Lough Crossing Comments Summary
  • Heritage Asset Audit reports

Not withstanding the fact that DfI were unable to privatise the Strangford ferry service in 1998, 2001 and 2005, below is how DfI would likely respond if there was a contractual relationship with a private ferry operator. Major strategic decisions are required and cannot be continually be put off.

DfI Response (as client):

“The Department takes its contractual oversight role seriously. The operator’s performance is measured against clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs):

  1. Service Reliability Performance:
  • Required: 97% of scheduled sailings
  • Actual delivery: 96.69%
  • Financial penalties will apply for underperformance
  • Contractor required to provide improvement plan
  1. Specific Service Failures 2023/24:
  • 108 weather-related cancellations (outside contractor control)
  • 32 staffing-related cancellations (contractor responsibility)
  • 550 industrial action cancellations (contractor responsibility)
  • 158 mechanical cancellations (contractor responsibility)
  1. Contract Enforcement Actions:
  • Formal improvement notices issued
  • Performance deductions applied
  • Enhanced monitoring implemented
  • Contingency planning review required
  1. Required Remedial Actions:
  • Staff recruitment/retention strategy
  • Vessel maintenance program review
  • Industrial relations improvement plan
  • Customer communication enhancements

The Department is actively managing the contract to ensure value for money and service quality for users.”

This response differs significantly from current approach as it:

  • Focuses on contractual obligations
  • Quantifies failures in monetary terms
  • Requires specific improvements
  • Takes enforcement position
  • Demonstrates active contract management

Sources:

  • Current DfI responses in TOF-1389-2024 and COR-1578-2024
  • Contract management principles from similar transport services
  • Performance monitoring frameworks in public transport contracts